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JOHN S. DAGGET'l', Respondent; PAUL R. SMITH et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE ATCHISON, TO-
PEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a 
Corporation) et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Evidence-Admissions-Precautions Subsequent to Accident.-
Generally, evidence of precautions taken and repairs made 
after the happening of an accident is not admissible to show 
a negligent condition at the time of the accident, but is admis-
sible to impeach the testimony of a witness. 
[2] Witnesses-Examination-Adverse Parties.-Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2055, relating to the examination of adverse parties, is 
remedial in character and to be construed liberally to 
the end that litigants would be afforded an opportunity to 
elicit from adverse parties the facts which those parties have 
in their sole possession. 
[3] !d.-Examination-Adverse Parties-Effect of Testimony.-
Code Civ. Proe., § 2055, relating to the calling of an adverse 
party as a witness, does not mean that the testimony of such 
witness may not be given its proper weight, but merely means 
that the party calling him shall not be precluded from rebut-
ting his testimony or from impeaching him; such testimony is 
to be treated as though given on cross-examination. 
[ 4] !d.-Examination-Adverse Parties-Cross-examination.-The 
extent to which cross-examination of a witness may be carried 
rests largely within the discretion of the trial court, and the 
same rule applies to a witness examined under Code Civ. 
Proc., § 2055. 
[ 5) !d.-Impeachment--Inconsistent Statesments-Cross-examina-
tion.-The limited cross-examination rule does not prevent 
questions on cross-examination as to matters affecting the 
accuracy or credibility of the witness. 
[6] !d.-Examination-Adverse Parties.-The adverse party or 
witness called under Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, is not the witness 
[1] Admissibility of evidence of repairs, change of conditions or 
precautions taken after accident, note, 170 A.L.R. 7. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 405; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 562. 
[2) See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, §50; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 560. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] EvidelleP, § HJ4; [2, 6] Witnesses, 
§93(1); [3, 8] Witnesses, ~93(4); [4] Witnesses, §93(3); [5] 
Witnesses,§ 256; [7] Witnesses,§§ 93(3), 258; [9] Evidence,§ 161; 
[10] Trial,§ 185; [11] Damages,§ 94; [12] Death,§ 69. 
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of the party calling him, sinee the code 
that such calling party shall not be bound 
of such adverse party. 
[7] !d.-Examination-Adverse Parties: Impeachment-Inconsist-
ent Statements.~In an action by a husband for the 
death of his wife and two children who were killed as a result 
of a collision of defendant's train and an automobile driven 
by the wife, where defendant's called as a witness 
hy the husband under Code Civ. Proc., § stated that 
the speed limit set by defendant at the 111 
was, at the time of the accident and at the time of 
miles an hour, and where a signal defend-
ant testified under § 2055 that the in at 
the time of the accident was the of automatie 
warning device, it was proper cross-examination for the hus-
band's counsel to show, by way of impeachment, that the speed 
limit was not 90 miles an hour at the time of trial but 50 miles 
an hour, and that, by reason of a request of the Public 
Utilities Commission, the wigwag in at the time 
of the accident had been replaced with fiashing red lights. 
[8] !d.-Examination-Adverse Parties-Effect of Testimony.--
Evidence admissible for impeachment purposes is admissible 
for the purpose of impeaching a witness called under Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2055, since such a witness does not stand in the 
Rame relation to the party calling him as doPs a witn!~ss who 
is called under ordinary conditions, but is more in the natnr!' 
of a witness of the adverse party. 
[9] Evidence-Evidence Admissible for One or More Purposes.---
If evidence is admissible for any purpose it must be received, 
though it may be improper for another purpose, but in 
trials the other party is entitled to an instruction limiting the 
purpose for which the evidence may be considered. 
[10] Trial-Instructions-Limiting Evidence-Request for Instruc-
tion.-Where evidence is admissible for a limited purpose 
only, it is not the duty of a judge to instruct the jury as to 
such purpose unless requested to do so, and having failed to 
request an instruction that certain impeaching evidence was 
admitted only for that purpose and was not otherwise compe-
tent, defendants may not complain on appPal. 
[11] Damages- Excessive Damages- Test.- While a 
court, in passing on the question of the amount of 
awarded a father for the death of his children, may consider 
amounts awarded in similar cases, in the final analysis the 
question in each case must be determined from its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances, and it cannot be held 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 124; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 263. 
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be~ 
cause the amount may be larger than is 
in such cases; it is only in a case where the amount 
award of general damages is so disproportionate to the 
suffered that the result reached may be said to shock the 
conscience, that an appellate court will step in and reverse 
a judgment because of greatly excessive or 
general damages. 
[12] Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Damages.-An award 
of $50,000 as damages to a father for the death of his two 
rhildren, aged 3 years rmd 10 months resywctively, was not 
a mntter of law so greatly excessise as to shoek the ronseiencP. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court oE San 
Diego County. Dean Sherry, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by surviving husband for death of wife and two 
children, and by wife's parents for her death. ,Jw1gment for 
surviving husband and adverse to wife's parents, affirmed. 
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CARTER, J.-Defendants, The Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Pe Railway Company, G. H. Benton (motorman), and 
Irwin M. Pike (conductor) appeal from a judgment in favor 
of John S. Daggett for the loss of his two minor children in 
an action arising out of a collision between one of defendant's 
passenger trains and an automobile driven by Paula Smith 
Daggett, who died in the same accident, at a railway crossing 
in Solana Beach. Olga Smith and Paul R. Smith, the parents 
of Paula Smith Daggett (wife of John S. Daggett) were also 
plaintiffs in the action but as to them the jury found in favor 
of defendant railway company. 
Neither the negligence of defendants, nor the contributory 
negligence of Paula Smith Daggett, are issues on this appeal. 
The only two assignments of error with respect to the evidence 
relate to the examination of defendant railway's employees 
called under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The 
facts therefore will be set forth as briefly as possible but with 
particular emphasis on the disputed evidence. 
The accident occurred at approximately 11 :18 a. m. on 
June 25, 1954. It was a clear day. Mrs. Daggett, who was 
24 years of age and eight months pregnant, was driving in a 
westerly direction on Plaza Street, Solana Beach, accom-
panied by her two minor children, aged 3 years and 10 
months, respectively. Defendant's train, which was traveling 
in a southerly direction at a speed of between 86 and 90 miles 
an hour crossed the intersection of Plaza Street on its rail-
road tracks at the same time as Mrs. Dag-gett's automobi1P 
which was estimated to be traveling at a speed of from 10 
to 15 miles per hour. Mrs. Daggett and the two minor chil-
dren were killed in the accident. On the north side of Plaza 
Street was a lumber company building about 75 feet from 
the crossing; on the same side of Plaza Street was a railroad 
siding on which stood a freight car about 100 feet from the 
crossing. Both the building and the freight car were on Mrs. 
Daggett's right (the direction from which the train ap-
proached the crossing) as she drove westerly on Plaza Street 
toward thr railroad crossing. On the northeast corner (on 
Mrs. Daggett's right) of the intersection of the tracks and 
Plaza Stn•Pt was an automatic wigwag signal located 12 feet 
0 inches abow the ground; 011 the southwest eorner of the 
erossing was a standard et·ossarm. Running parallel to, ano 
a very short distanee fl'om, drfenclaut 's railroad tracks is the 
Pacific Coast Highway which intersects Plaza Street after 
it crosses the tracks. At this intersection there is a traffic 
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light for vPhicular traffic. Hinging cireuits for the operation 
of the wigwag signal were set off by a southbound train at a 
point 3,023 feet north of Plaza Street where it intersects with 
the tracks. In view of the spePd at which defPudant 's train 
was approaching the intersection, this would result in the 
operation of the automatic wigwag signal for approximately 
22 seconds. 
OlPuu H. Benton, a defendant and the motorman who 
was operating the train at the time of the accident, was thP 
first witness called by plaintiffs under section 2055 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure.2 Mr. Benton testified that the train 
which he was operating at the time of the accident was a four-
unit Diesel with 10 passenger ears; that it was capable of a 
speed of 100 miles an hour; that at the time of the accident 
he had the train in throttle ''position 8 '' (the highest speed 
position) and that the train was going from 85 to 90 miles 
an hour ; that the railroad speed limit for that crossing was 
90 miles an hour and that this was considered a safe speed. 3 
The witness also testified that on the day in question the 
train was 15 minutes late and that he was trying to make up 
time. Mr. Benton testified that the area involved was part 
of the fourth district and that the speed limit for that dis-
trict was 90 miles an hour. The witness testified that the 
speed ''is 90 now on the first, second, and fourth districts. '' 
(Emphasis added.) Over objection by defense counsel the 
following occurred: " Q. [By plaintiffs' counsel] : Well, Mr. 
Benton, the restriction now is 50 miles an hour, isn't it?" 
Plaintiffs' counsel, in answer to the court's question concern-
ing the district to which he was referring, replied : ''He is 
referring to the fourth. He says the restriction in the fourth 
district now is 90 miles an hour. \V e are prepared to show 
that the restriction in this district at this crossing now, rather 
than being 90 miles an hour, is 50 miles an hour.'' In re-
sponse to defense counsel's request to take "this matter" up 
1 There was evidence in the record that this light, rather than the 
automatic wigwag signal predominated the view of vehicular traffic 
proceeding in a westerly direction on Plaza Street. 
2 A party to the record of any civil action or proceeding . . . may be 
examined by the adverse party as if under cross-examination, subject 
to the rules applicable to the examination of other witnesses. 'rhe 
party calling such adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony, 
and the testimony given by snch witness may he rebutted by the party 
calling him for such examination by other evidence .... 
3 The record shows that an average of 2,500 automobiles crossed the 
tracks daily at this intersection. 
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of the presence of the jury, the court ruled that ''He has 
to say what he expects to prove or what he expects to 
this witness to testify to. It is cross-examination, a legiti-
mate statement.'' Over objection by defense counsel, the fol-
took place: "Q. [Plaintiffs' counsel]: Mr. Benton, you 
say that the in these areas then and now are 90 miles 
hour .L\.fter objection and a holding that the question 
was a one, the witness answered a simplified 
that the speed "now" at the "Plaza area" was 50 
miles an hour. 
'l'he second witness called by plaintiffs was ·william Price, 
engineer for the defendant railway company. Mr. 
who qualified as an expert witness, and who testified 
under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure said that 
he was "absolutely sure" that the type of signal in use at 
the Plaza crossing at the time of the accident was ''the safest 
type of signal." Counsel for plaintiffs, over objection, ques-
tioned the witness and brought out that since the accident 
the California Public Utilities Commission had requested de-
fendant railway company to change the single wigwag signal 
to two "flashing light signals" located 8 feet above the 
ground level. Over objection, the court permitted the jury 
to view the scene of the accident at a time when a train 
crossed the intersection. At this time, of course, the speed 
limit had been reduced and new signals installed. However, 
photographs of the crossing with the new signals installed 
had been theretofore admitted in evidence without objection 
defense counsel.4 
Defendants contend that the court committed prejudicial 
error in admitting evidence of changes made subsequent to 
the time of the accident. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence 
was not admitted for the purpose of showing changed con-
ditions but to impeach the witnesses called by them under 
section 2055. It is also argued by defendants that evidence 
of changed conditions may not be used to impeach a witness 
called under section 2055, and that the error was magnified 
by plaintiffs' counsel during argument to the jury. 
[1] It is the general rule in this state that evidence of 
precautions taken and repairs made after the happening of 
4In Chnrch v. Headrick <f Brown, 101 Cal.App.2d 396, 413, 414 [225 
P.2d 5ii8l, it was held that where evidence of changed conditions was 
admitted by the court without objection the admission of similar evi-
dence from another witness, over objection, was not ground for a re-
versal. See also Dyas v. Southern Pac. Co., 140 Cal. 296, 306 [73 P.2d 
972]. 
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the accident is not admissible to show a negligent condition 
at the time of the accident. (Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 
303 [78 P. 710] ; Church v. Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal.App. 
2d 396, 413 [225 P.2d 558] .) The reason for the rule was 
well stated in Sappenfield v. Main St. etc. R. R. 91 CaL 
48, 62 [27 P. 590] : "It would be unjust to hold that because 
the employer seeks, by all the aid he gets from the light of 
experience, to make the implement free from danger he is 
therefore to be charged with negligence in the use of all 
prior appliances, even though they were adopted with the 
best light then at his command .... He may have exercised 
all the care which the law requires, and yet in the light of a 
new experience, after an unexpected accident has occurred, 
he may adopt additional safeguards. To hold that the adop-
tion of such new appliances which experience has demonstrated 
are more efficient than those previously in use, or which in-
vention has developed :from observing the defects in those 
originally adopted, shall be an admission that he was negli-
gent prior thereto would prevent the very conduct in em-
ployers which they should be urged to follow." 
This court has held, however, that "Although evi-
dence of the character here in question may not be admissible 
to prove negligence at the time of the accident, it is proper to 
impeach the testimony of a witness. (lnyo Chemical Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra [ 5 Cal.2d 525 (55 P .2d 850)].) 
In the case at bar, the record discloses that prior to the testi-
mony of the witness Bromfield with relation to the cessation 
of waxing the floor, said witness had testified that he had 
'looked at the floor (immediately after the accident) and-
did not notice anything unusual about the floor,' and the de-
fendants at all times maintained that there was nothing wrong 
with the floor. The evidence of his having later ordered that 
the floor not be waxed tended to impeach that testimony by 
showing that he had changed his mind with reference to 
there being nothing wrong with the floor, and was admissible 
for that purpose." (Hatfield v. Levy Brothers, 18 Cal.2d 
798, 809, 810 [117 P.2d 841]; see also the following cases hold-
ing that evidence of changed conditions is admissible by way 
of impeachment: Gorman v. County of Sacranuc;nto, 92 Cal. 
App. 656, 666 (268 P. 108i1l ; Uttley \'. City Santa Ana, 
136 Cal.App. 23, 28 128 P .2d 377] ; I nyo Chem1:cal Co. v. 
of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 525, 543 [55 P.2d 850].) 
It is argued by defendants, however, that such evidence is 
permissible only to impeach evidence produced by the other 
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party to the action and not for the purpose of impeaching 
original evidence produced by plaintiffs. The question thus 
squarely presented is whether an adverse witness called under 
section 2055 is the witness of the party calling him. 
Mr. Wigmore points out (3d ed., III, § 916, p. 431) that 
"If there is any situation in which any semblance of reason 
disappears for the application of the rule against impeaching 
one's own witness, it is when the opposing party is himself 
called by the ji1·st party, and is sought to be compelled to dis-
close under oath that truth which he knows but is naturally 
unwilling to make known. To say that the :first party guar-
antees the opponent's credibility (ante, § 898) is to mock him 
with a false formula; he hopes that the opponent will speak 
truly, but he equally perceives the possibilities of the con-
trary, and he no more guarantees the other's credibility than 
he guarantees the truth of the other's case and the falsity 
of his own. To say, furthermore, that the :first party, if he 
could impeach at will, holds the means of improperly coercing 
the other (ante, § 899) is to proceed upon a singular interpre-
tation of human nature and experience, and to attribute a 
power which the former may perhaps wish that he had but 
certainly cannot be clothed with by this or any other rule. 
There is therefore no reason why the rule should apply at 
all." (Emphasis that of the author.) 
This court held in Sntellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 
540, 556 [299 P. 529], that a witness called under section 
2055 "does not stand in the same relation to the party calling 
him as does a witness who is called under ordinary con-
ditions. He is more in the nature of a witness of the adverse 
party. . . . Such a witness has none of the characteristics 
of a witness called by a party under the ordinary rules of 
procedure, but many of the characteristics of a witness called 
by the adverse party." (See also 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 105.) 
Section 2055 provides that a party to the action may br 
rxamined by the adverse party as if under cross-examination, 
subject to the rules applicable to the examination of other 
witnesses. (Figari v. Olcese, 184 Cal. 775 [195 P. 425, 15 
A.IJ.R. 192] ; W eck v. Los Angeles County Flood Control 
Dist., 80 Cal.App.2d 182 [J 81 P.2d 935].) Section 2048 of the 
Code of Ci vii Procedure provides that '"l'he opposite party 
may cross-examine the witness as to any facts stated in his 
direet examination or connected therewith, and in so doing 
may put leading questions, but if he examines him as to other 
matters, sueh examination is to be subject to the same rules 
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as a direct examinatiou." 1t will be recalled that plaintiffs 
called defendant Benton a]](l defendant railroad's agent, Pike. 
as the first two witnesses at the trial. Prior tn their testi~ 
mony there bad been nn direct examination. [2] Section 
2055 has been held to be remedial ill character and a statute 
to be construed liberally to the end that litigants would be 
afforded an opportunity to elicit from adverse parties the 
fads >vhich those parties have iu their sole possessiou. (Smellie 
v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 556 [299 P. 529]; Law-
le:;s v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81, 90 [147 P.2d 604] .) 
1 t has been heretofore held that the party calling a witness 
under section 2055 does uot vouch for the credibility of such 
witness (First Nat. Bank of Petersburg v. Shipley, 109 Cal. 
App. 194 [292 P. 996]) ; that the calling party may impeach 
the witness (Batchelor v. Caslavka, 128 Cal.App.2d 819, 822 
[276 P.2d 64] ; Karnbmtrian v. Gray, 81 Cal.App.2d 783, 789 
[185 P.2d 27] ; Frymire v. Brown, 94 Cal.App.2d 334, 341 
[210 P.2d 707]). [3] In the Batchelor case the court said: 
''Section 2055 does not mean that the testimony of an adverse 
witness may not be given its proper weight. It merely means 
that the party calling such witness shall not be precluded 
from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching the wit-
ness; such testimony is to be treated as though given on cross-
examination." IN e held in Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 
81, 90 [147 P.2d 604], that "Any relevant matter in issue in 
a case is within the scope of the examination of witnesses called 
pursuant to the provisions of such [2055] statutes." [4] The 
extent to which cross-examination of a witness may be carried 
rests, of course, largely within the discretion of the trial court 
and the same rule applies to a witness examined under section 
2055. (Paul v. Key System, 80 Cal.App.2d 21, 27, 28 [180 
P.2d 940]; Scott v. Del Monte Properties, Inc., 140 Cal.App. 
2d 756, 763 [295 P.2d 947]; Cooper v. Nationalillotor Bearing 
Co., 136 Cal.App.2d 229, 232 [288 P.2d 581] .) 
[5] It has been held that the limited cross-examination 
rule does not prevent questions on cross-examination as to 
matters affecting the accuracy or credibility of the witness 
(Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal.App.2d 229, 
232 [288 P.2d 581] ; VoU v. H allis, 60 Cal. 569; People v. 
Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 184 [148 P.2d 627]; People. v. Showers, 
90 Cal.App.2d 248, 254 [202 P.2d 8141; Luis v. Cavin, 88 
Cal.App.2d 107, 114 [198 P.2d 563]; People v. Tal7man, 27 
Cal.2d 209 [163 P.2d 857] ). In the Tallman case, this court 
said (at page 214) : "A wide latitude is permitted in the 
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cross-examination of an expert witness in all matters testing 
so that the jury may determine the weight to 
the testimony .... " And in People v. Vollmann, 
Cal.App.2d 769, 790 [167 P.2d 545], the court held that 
it was proper when discrediting a witness by his own admis-
sions to cross-examine him as to inconsistent statements with-
out a foundation. 
[6] It is obvious that the adverse party, or witness, called 
under section 2055 is not the witness of the party calling him 
v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 CaL 540 [299 P. 529] ; 
v. Oleese, 184 Cal. 775, 782 [195 P. 425, 15 A.L.R. 
192]) inasmuch as the code specifically provides that such 
calling party shall not be bound by the testimony of such 
adverse party. When the various rules (heretofore set 
forth) are summarized it appears that a party caHing a wit-
ness under section 2055 does not vouch for his credibility 
(First Nat. Bank v. Shipley, 109 Cal.App. 194, 200 [292 P. 
996] }.i that the calling party may impeach such a witness 
(Batcli¥:lor v. Caslavka, 128 Cal.App.2d 819 [276 P.2d 64] ; 
Green~' Newmark, 136 Cal.App. 32, 37 [28 P.2d 395]); and, 
according to the section itself, may examine such a witness 
as if on cross-examination; and that the limited cross-examina-
tion rule does not prevent questions on cross-examination as 
to matters affecting the accuracy or credibility of the witness 
(Voll v. Hollis, 60 Cal. 569, 576). [7] Applying these rules 
to the situation at hand, the record shows that the witness 
Benton, called under section 2055, stated that the speed limit 
set by defendant railway company for the Plaza Street cross-
ing was, at the time of the accident and at the time of trial, 
90 miles an hour; that the signal expert, an employee of de-
fendant railway company, testified, under section 2055, that 
the wigwag signal in place at the time of the accident was 
the safest type of automatic warning device. Counsel for 
plaintiffs showed, during the cross-examination, and by way 
of impeachment, that, in the first instance, the speed limit 
was not 90 miles an hour at the time of trial but 50 miles an 
hour, and, in the second instance that, by reason of the re-
quest of the Public Utilities Commission, the wigwag signal 
in place at the time of the accident had been replaced with 
flashing red lights. This was proper cross-examination and 
was ''for the purpose of weakening the testimony of defend-
ant's expert witness by showing that he had subsequently 
changed his opinion as to the . . . '' safety of the conditions 
prevailing at the time of the accident. (Inyo Ckernical Co. 
v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 525, 543 [55 P.2d 850] .) 
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of the type under eonsicleration sinee admissible for 
ment purposes (Jlrdfield Y. 18 Ca1.2d 798 f117 
P.2d 8411; Tnyo Chemical Cn. Y. J:os 5 CaL 
2d 525 [55 P.2d 850] ). should not b\' cu1missihlc for the pur-
pose of impraehing a witness eallrd nnder srrtion 2055 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure sinee sw·.h a \VitlH'ss "docs not stand 
in the same relation to tlJC pari,v ralling him as dors a witnrsf' 
who is callrd under ordinar.v condition;:;. He is more in the 
nature of a witness of the advrrsr party .... " 
Southern Pae. Co., 212 CaL 540, 506 P. .) [9] The 
rule is well settled that if eYidence is admissible for any rmr-
pose it must he n•(•eived, eYen it be im-
proper for another purpose. 191 CaL 470 
[217 P. 733].) In jury trials, however, the other is 
entitled to an instrnetion limiting the pnrpo~e for whieh the 
evidence ma,v be considered (Ifai[icld Y. Brnthers, 18 CaL 
2d 798 [117 P.2d 8H]; Inyn Clwm:cal ro. Y. ~OS An-
aeles, 5 CaL2d 5275 r55 P.2d ). [10] Rnt whrre evidence 
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is admissible for a limited purpose only, it is not the duty of 
a judge to instruct the jury as to such purpose unless re-
quested to do so (Lewis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal.App.2d 
358, 362 [220 P.2d 431] ; Packard v. Mom·e, 9 Cal.2d 571, 573 
[71 P.2d 922] ; Craig v. Boyes, 123 Cal.App. 592, 600 [11 P.2d 
673]). Having failed to request an instruction that the im-
peaching evidence was admitted only for that purpose and 
was not otherwise competent, defendants may not now com-
plain. (Hatfield v. Levy Brothers, 18 Cal.2d 798, 810 [117 
P.2d 841]; Inyo Chemical Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 
525, 544 [55 P.2d 850] .) 
Defendants contend that the award of damages of $50,000 
to plaintiff JohnS. Daggett for the loss of his two minor chil-
dren was so excessive that it must have been given under the 
influence of passion and prejudice. Defendants concede that 
each case is to be determined upon its own facts (Christy v. 
Ulrich, 113 Cal.App. 338 [298 P. 135]) but argue that the 
factors to be considered in an award of damages to a parent 
for the death of his children are the loss of comfort and so-
ciety to the parent of the children and the loss of the subse-
quent protection of the parent by the children, "mitigated, 
however, as harsh as such a rule may seem, by the pecuniary 
gain of the parent in the elimination of the expense of rearing 
the children." The jury was so instructed and no contention 
is made that the jury was not properly instructed as to the 
factors involved in an action of the type under consideration. 
[11] While a reviewing court, in passing upon the question 
involved here, may consider amounts awarded in similar cases 
(Osrowitz v. Market Investment Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 179, 185 
[104 P.2d 681) ; Power v. California St. Cable R.R. Co., 52 
Cal.App.2d 289, 292 [126 P.2d 4]), in the final analysis the 
question in each case must be determined from its own pe-
ruliar facts and circumstances (Kirshbatfm v. McCarthy, 5 
Cal.2d 191 [54 P.2d 8]) and it cannot be held as a matter 
of law that a verdict is excessive simply because the amount 
may be larger than is ordinarily allowed in such cases. It is 
only in a case where the amount of the award of general 
damages is so disproportionate to the injuries suffered that the 
result reached may be said to shock the conscience, that an 
appellate court will stt>p in and reverse a judgment because 
of greatly <'Xl~essive or grossly inadequate general damages. 
(Tyson v. Rorney, 88 Cal.App.2d 752, 757 [199 P.2d 721].) 
[12] Taking into eonsideration the facts and eircumstances 
presented by the ease under consideration we cannot hold, as a 
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matter of law, that the award of damages to John S. Daggett 
for the loss of his two minor children, aged :3 years and 10 
months, respertively, is so gTPatly rxeessivP as: to Rhock thP 
conscience. 
Insofar as the appeal of Olga Smith anrl Paul R. Smith, 
parents of Paula Smith Daggett, is concerned, we cannot say, 
as a matter of law, that there is no evidence to support the 
implied finding of the jury that the decea:,;ed Paula Rmith 
Daggett was guilty of contributory negligenee. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and 'l'raynor, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is my view that it was preju-
dicial error to bring before the jury the fact that after the 
accident defendant railroad company reduced its speed limita-
tion from 90 to 50 miles an hour at the intersection in Solano 
Beach where the railroad tracks crossed Plaza Street and 
where the accident occurred. The attempt to defend such an 
error as being merely the presentation of impeaching evidence 
appears to me to be without support in the record. To the 
contrary, the record affirmatively shows that at no time did 
the witness, Benton, testify that the limitation for the crossing 
remained at 90 miles an hour at the time of trial. His testi-
mony was clearly to the effect that the general limitation for 
the entire fourth district-i.e., the area from Fullerton to 
San Diego-was 90 miles both at the time of the accident and 
at the time of trial, and he had further made clear that there 
were other limitations calling for lesser speeds at various 
smaller areas within the district. Moreover, any confusion 
as to speeds, times, and districts or areas appears from the 
record to have been invited and brought about by counsel for 
plaintiffs, who then seizerl upon such alleged confusion as an 
excuse to get before the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence 
of a change in the speed limitation after the accident. The 
following excerpts from the examination of Benton by counsel 
for plaintiffs, who had called him as a witness under section 
2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, will so demonstrate (all 
italics have been added) : 
"Q. [By counsel for plaintiff] What ·was [at the time of the 
accident] that crossing posted for as far as the railroarl was 
concerned 1 A. 90 miles an hour .... 
the Los Angeles side of 
had last to pick up some 
down at the district is 90 miles 
per with where there is curve restric-
11·ons or restrictions otherwise. 
dicl you go across that intersec-
Between 80-between 80 and 90 
this intersection your speed varies [note 
present tense used eounsel for plaintiff] between 80 and 
90 miles an hour ? A. sir. . . . 
" Could yon go as as 90 miles an hour around this 
t:urve that eomes into Solano Beaeh or is [note the present 
that restricted to less~ A. 'l'hat is 90 miles an hour. 
"Q. And do I understand that you could go 90 miles an 
hour all the ·way from IJOS to San Diego~ A. No, 
beeause lh ere curve rest1·ictions and other 
How about that curve from Cardiff into the place of 
the accident; isn't that curve restricted 
to 85? A. That's a 90 mile an hour curve .... 
" ~Ton have driven these diesels similar to the 
one you ·were on that day for some time, haven't 
yon A. sir. 
'' Q. And in those diesels, have you gone over 90 
miles an hour ·with them .... A .. I have. Those diesels are a 
hundred-n1ile-an-hour but that partieular district is 90 
mile restriction down there. Tlwt's known as the fonrth dis-
trict . ... 
'' Q. ·what does fourth distriet mean; ean you tell us? A. 
\Yell, that's the district from one station to the other. 
"Q. That has nothing to do with the type of speed, does it¥ 
A. No. 
nomenclature of the area, merely geographically 
a or appellation of the area, what it is called; is 
A. '"What the eompany, what partieular restriction 
put on that partienlar district, why [the reason why] I 
know. 
"Q. Is present tense employed by eounsel for plain-
tiff] that put on the whole distriet from Los Angeles all the 
way to San Diego? A. That just runs from Fullerton to San 
,r nnP 1 Dfl71 flMlGJ:TT 
hnt from 
third district. 
"Q. And then have 
in that area? A. That 
"Q. What do yon go 
between 1:<-,nllerton and Los 
strietion on all th~t1·icts 
is !)0 miles an hour. 
"Q. How about between Full('l'ion 
That is 90 rniles an hour, too. 
"Q. So then~ 1:s no more rest l'id ion thPre i hm1 do>Yn 
here? A Not at this time. T don't reenll \Yhe11H~r-~ii was a 
hundl'ed on all r1istriets hnt th(· thil'd n1Hl tile fourth 
it \Yas less, but it is the same all oyrr now, with 
of the third distriet. 'l'lmt is 80. 
"Q. Yon arc not speaking of 1vhat it is now, are yon A. No. 
lt is 90 now on the first, and districts. 
"Q. \Vell, Mr. Benton, the restriction now is 50 miles an 
hour, isn't it? 
"MR. NIELSEN [Counsel for to 
that, your Honor, on the ground that l1a;.; no 
case. 
"THE CoURT: I don't know what distriet you refer to. 
"MR. BEI,u [Conm;el for plaintiffs[: He is to the 
fourth. He says that tlw restridion in thr: 
is 90 miles an hour. 1Y r; nr!l 
firm in this district at this 
fo slu)/1~ that the rcstric· 
11011~, rai11rr than !)0 
miles an honr, is 50 miles an hour. 
"JHR.J'\IEI,SEN: .Just a moment :vom· Honor. T1et's take this 
up outside the presence of the jury. I c-ite the statement 
of eonnsel as miseondnct in to before the 
jnry a totally immaterial iss11e. 
"TnE CoFRT: Cmmsrl is simply or ihe 
''a"r, what he to proYf'. si1·. 
''MR. Bm,u: Q. :Mr. BP11ton, yon sa,\· thai tlH' ~prrds in 
these areas then alHlnow arr !)0 miles an ho11r 
"MR. NIELSEN: I ·will objeet to that--
" THE Conrr: 'rhat is . Thrn and 
"Mrc BFLLr: Q. You haY'' i ol(l u~ 1 hat the 
right now is no miles an hom·. 
"JVII~. KNowr;ro~ I CouJJ;.;(•l f()r (hcl:elidanh; I 
I objed to that que:,;tioll as lwing· innnatPri,d. The 
faetor there is the speed at thr timrc of this aecidcnt. 
Honor, 
eritical 
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''THE CouRT: I thought-now, if you mean the entire area 
from Los Angeles to San Diego--
"MR. BELLI: First that and then a-t Plaza Street. 
''THE CoURT: vV ell, I don't know yet. You say first and 
then Plaza Street. I don't know whether ym~ mean there at 
Solano Beach at the intersection in question or whether you 
mean an entire area between Los Angeles and San Diego. It is 
vague and indefinite to me, sir. 
"MR. BELLI: May I withdraw that and put it this way, your 
Honor? 
'' Q. Mr. Benton, is it you1· testimony that the speed area 
nt this Plaza Street now is 90 miles an hour 1 
''MR. KNOWLTON: I object to that question, your Honor, 
on the grounds it is immaterial to any issue in this case. 
''THE CouRT: Objection overruled. You may answer. 
'' Q. The speed now at the Plaza area. A. 50 miles an hour. 
"MR. BELLI: Q. It is 50 miles now? A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. Do ym~ know when that was changed to 50 miles an 
hour? 
"MR. KNOWLTON: The same objection, your Honor. 
''THE CouRT: Objection sustained. 
"MR. BELLI: Q. At the time of the accident, the speed at the 
Plaza crossing was 90 miles an hour? 
"MR. KNOWLTON: Object to that question, your Honor, on 
the grounds it has been asked and answered four times. 
''THE CouRT: Objection sustained.'' 
From the above-quoted portion of the record it is apparent 
that counsel for plaintiffs, by swinging back and forth be-
tween past tense and present tense, and by discussing speed 
restrictions without specific indication of whether he referred 
to restrictions within entire railroad districts or to restric-
tions at a smaller area within a district (such as at the Plaza 
Street crossing here involved), succeeded in confusing not 
only Benton, the witness, but also the court itself. Counsel 
then seized upon the confusion which he himself had en-
gendered, to not only bring before the jury the fact that the 
restriction at the Plaza Street crossing had been changed to 
50 miles, but to emphasize that the change had taken place 
f;Ubscquent to the accident. The admission of such improper 
evidenee could not, and did not, tend to impeach the witness, 
who at no time had testified that the Plaza Street inter-
section speed had remained at 90 miles an hour up to the 
time of trial; on the contrary, the witness had clearly stated 
that the overall restriction in the fourth district (i.e., from 
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J•'ullerton to San Diego) remained at 90 miles, but. he had 
also several times referred to ''curve restrictions and other 
forms of restrictions" within districts~ references which were 
plainly understood by plaintiff's counsel, who himself like-
wise referred to such lesser restrictions. Inasmuch as the 
issue of negligence on the part of defendants was close, it ap-
pears that the error of admitting such evidence of changed 
l~ouditions was prejudicial. 
As stated in the majority opinion, the jury impliedly found 
that the deeeased mother of the children, who was driving 
the automobile in which they were riding when they met their 
death, was guilty of contributory negligence. That auto-
mobile was estimated to have been traveling at a speed of 
from 10 to 15 miles an hour at the Plaza Street intersection 
when the accident occurred. The accident took place shortly 
before midday, and the weather was clear. Four disinterested 
witnesses testified that the automatic wigwag was in operation 
prior to and at the time of the collision, and that the train 
was whistling as it approached. The engineer, Benton, testi-
fied that the automatic bell on the locomotive had been ringing 
continuously from Oceanside (some 15 miles north of Solano 
Beach), and that an emergency brake application was made 
some 100 feet prior to the point of impact in response to the 
fireman's warning of the approaching automobile. The speed 
tape sealed within the locomotive placed its speed at between 
85 and 86 miles an hour at the time the emergency brake ap-
plication was made. Both the engineer and the fireman testi-
fied further that the train air horn was blown for the Plaza 
Street crossing from a point at least 1,000 feet north of the 
crossing. Further, plaintiff Daggett testified that both he 
and his deceased wife had become familiar with the crossing 
prior to the accident, as well as the operation of the trains 
and protective devices. 
In view of the above related evidence, the prejudicial effect 
of the erroneous admission of testimony concerning the reduc-
tion in the speed limitation at the subject crossing following 
the accident appears clear. I would reverse the judgment 
in favor of plaintiff ,John S. Daggett. 
Spence, J., and McComb, ,J., concurred. 
The petition of defendants and appellants for a rehearing 
was denied July 16, 1957. Schauer, ,J., Spenee, .T., and Me-
Comb, .T., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
